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EDITORIAL 
Pembaca yang budiman, 
EDITORIAL ii 
Segala puji dan ungkapan rasa syukur hanya tertuju kepada Allah 
SWT, sehingga atas perkenanNYA jualah maka JURNAL HUKUM 
HUMANITER ini dapat kembali terbit di tengah-tengah para pembaca. 
Edisi ini berisi lanjutan artikel utama yang memaparkan tentang 
permasalahan yang dihadapi dalam melakukan kontra-insurgensi pada 
beberapa sengketa bersenjata seperti pada Perang Vietnam dan Perang 
Irak, sehingga diharapkan kita dapat memetik pelajaran mengenai hal 
tersebut. Dalam suatu sengketa bersenjata yang mendasarkan kepada 
aturan-aturan hukum humaniter internasional, maka suatu hal yang 
tidak mungkin dielakkan adalah adanya persinggungan dengan norma­
norma di dalam hukum hak asasi manusia internasional yang juga 
dibahas dengan singkat dalam edisi ini. Ada pun masalah-masalah yang 
berkenaan dengan pertanggungjawaban dalam suatu sengketa 
bersenjata dikemukakan juga dalam edisi kali ini, khususnya mengenai 
konsep pengadilan campuran. Artikel pendukung yang kali ini berkaitan 
erat dengan kolom, akan menampilkan persidangan di Mahkamah Pidana 
Internasional, yakni persidangan Thomas Lubanga Dyilo yang dituduh 
melakukan wajib militer terhadap anak-anak di bawah usia lima belas 
tahun di Kongo. 
Sebagai is i  "Kolom", a kan dipaparkan perkembangan­
perkembangan terakhir dalam Mahkamah Pidana Internasional, 
khususnya yang berkenaan dengan persidangan-persidangan kasus­
kasus yang telah disidangkan di mahkamah ini yakni kasus di Kongo, 
Republik Afrika Tengah, Darfur dan di Uganda Utara; di samping 
dipaparkan pula mengenai perkembangan terakhir tentang apa yang 
terjadi pada mahkamah tersebut sejak Januari hingga Juli 2008. 
Atas keterlambatan penerbitan JURNAL HUKUM HUMANITER, 
maka Redaksi menyampaikan permohonan maaf, sekaligus mengajak 
para pembaca dari  segenap kalangan di tanah air  untuk 
menyemarakkan wacana ini dengan mengirimkan artikelnya. Akhirnya, 
segala kritik dan saran konstruktif dari pembaca sangat diharapkan 
demi perbaikan jurnal di masa mendatang. 
Selamat membaca. 
Redaksi 
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INSURGENCY AND COUNTER INSURGENCY 
SOME CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS 
Nils Marius Rekkedal 1 
Abstract 
This article present and discuss several of the key concepts in use 
when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines 
and regulations), to describe the different forms of insurgency. One 
of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent wars are 
different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author has 
also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain 
basic characteristics in these forms of warfare. We can also find in 
this article some of the key concepts and problems regarding 
insurgency, guerrilla warfare and methods of insurgency as well. 
5. Can we learn a nything from past a nd contemporary 
examples and thinking? 
At this point, I will, by means of a few examples and a short 
presentation on earlier th inking on counter-insurgency, attempt to 
describe some ideas that have been used in connection with earlier 
attempts at bringing i nsurgency under control. There is much to 
suggest that it is not new technology that is decisive, but being able 
to set realistic targets and following up these objectives over a long 
period of time. However, there is hardly any 'miracle method' that 
ensures that those making use of this method/these theories wi l l  
win in the end. 
a. Northern Ireland - an example of a lengthy low intensity 
confli ct  (UC) 
Can we learn anything from this conflict? Developments in 
Northern Ireland have been studied by many people and th is low 
1 Ni ls Marius Rekkedal is Professor War Studies, especially Military Theory at the Swedish 
National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden. This article is the last part of the three articles 
written by the author. 
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intensity conflict in  Western Europe has cost more than 2,000 l ives 
over the last 30 years. 2 Without a doubt, this 'war' satisfies the 
requirements for being a low intensity conflict (LIC), in the manner 
in  which this type has been previously defined here. There are 
undoubtedly differences in maturity from one regime to another, 
someth ing that can obviously be seen when they are chal lenged. 
The manner in which the British have attempted to l imit/control the 
confl ict has also varied over a period of time. 
During its reign of terror in Northern Ireland, the IRA often ignored 
the element of the local population that remained passive to the 
terrorist activity. However, the terrorists focused broadly and ruthlessly 
on those they regarded as disagreeing, even if they remained passive. 
The Englishman Richard Clutterbuck has, in one of his books, stated 
that, after a l ittle more than three years of 'warfare', they had used 
four times as many explosives as The Special Operations Executive 
had used for sabotage attacks in  France during the entire Second 
World War, but no detai ls of the operations are presented in the 
book.3 
The terror in Northern Ireland is rather unique for other reasons: 
the actual guerri l la warfare and the associated terror were conducted 
somewhat differently in urban areas than in rural areas. The conflict 
was also characterised by the media campaigns of both sides while 
secret pol itical negotiations with the British and Irish Governments 
were ongoing. The breadth of non-violent activities demonstrated in 
the IRA's campaign may be an  interesting contrast to a l l  the conflicts 
in  rura l  districts i n  the Thi rd World we otherwise have gained 
experience of. As a result of having lasted so many years, the conflict 
in Northern Ireland has gone through so many stages over such a 
long time that changes in technologica l and political maturity can 
real ly be measured here. Entire pol itica l careers have actual ly run 
their course with in the time frame of today's conflict. 4 
2 Magne Haugseng, The Tightening Grip. Northern Ireland - The Military and 35 Years of 
Terror (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, War Studies Research Reports No. 
14, 2006), see pp. 85-108. 
J Richard Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urban Guerrilla (New York: Abelard-Schumann, 1974), 
p. 100. 
� M. Haugseng (2006), ibid., pp. 109-123. 
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It cannot be emphasised strongly enough that, in order to tackle 
the 'gloca le' problems of today, i .e ., which are both local and 
international  at the same time, we should a lso study our own 
multicultural society in the West. Large streams of refugees to Western 
Europe over the course of the last few decades have created a number 
of smal l  'ghetto communities' where the ethnic minorities' cultures 
and languages dominate. Other refugees and immigrants who are 
more broad ly integrated wi l l  often have ties within these micro 
societies. If one or more of these 'societies within society' were to 
introduce an LIC in a European country, the lessons from Third World 
countries with their more 'primitive' confl icts would probably be of 
reduced va lue.5  The l imited abi l ity (and wi l l) of most European 
countries to integrate foreign cultures is seen as providing potential 
conflict. 
b. The releva n ce of earl ier French theories a bout 
insurgency? 
The Vietnam War during the period that the United States was 
mil itarily heavily involved (from 1965 to 1972) is probably the best­
documented confl ict in the Third World. It is, however, the case that 
those wishing to study 'classic' counter-insurgency campaigns that 
are not altogether too far back in time, can find a lot of 'alternative 
thinking' in the French wars in Indochina and Algeria respectively. A 
book written by the controversial French colonel and mil itary theorist 
Roger Trinquier (born 1908) is one of the books documenting French 
experiences and points of view: ways of thinking that may appear 
controversial today. Trinquier served in China, Indochina and Algeria, 
and it was against this background that he wrote his controversia l  
book. 6 H is  book from 1961 was soon tra nslated into Eng l ish, 
something that faci l itates studies for most people who have a rather 
l imited knowledge of French . The English translation of the book is 
ca l led Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency.7 The 
5 Cf., the South Moluccas' various frustrated 'freedom movements' which perpetrated several 
acts of terror in the Netherlands in the 1970s. 
6 The title of the original is La guerre modern [Modern Warfare], and can be seen as an overall 
attempt at creating a French counter-insurgency theory. Opponents have seen the book as a 
'blueprint' for mil itary totalitarianism. See the next footnote for details. 
7 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, translator Daniel 
Lee, with an introduction by Bernard B. Fall (New York: Praeger, 1964). 
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book has, without doubt, been one of the most influential books of 
its kind written and was a bestseller in France, something that is not 
very common for this type of specialist literature. The book is unusually 
direct and realistically written and provides a unique insight into how 
the French paratrooper forces, with their reference point being their 
previous participation over many years in the war against the Vietminh 
in Indochina ( 1946-1954), developed and carried out their campaign 
in Algeria in the period from 1956-1959.8 They had learned from the 
Vietminh in Indochina and subsequently made use of the combat 
techniques they themselves had gained personal experience of in 
the colonial wars, including the use of torture (which was naturally 
enough extremely controversial in France) .  Even if the French troops 
can, in many ways, be seen to have won the battle against the local 
liberation group (the FLN), they were not able to win the war politically. 
President de Gaulle and his political circles decided to end the war 
and concentrate on developing France as an atomic power - the 
illusion of still being a European superpower became the priority. 
In our recent time it is probably Mark Bowden's book Black Hawk 
Down : A Story of Modern War,9 about the attempt by the American 
Ranger and Delta Force to capture one of Somalia's warlords in  
October 1993 that i s  of most popular interest, symbolised by the 
significant sales of the book.10 
Even if there must, by necessity, be a difference between a 
liberation war towards the end of the colonial world as Trinquier 
describes and the civil war like situation that Bowden describes about 
40 years later in Somalia, there are nevertheless several similar 
features between the wars of the two eras. If we also study the 
conflicts in the Balkans early in the 1990s, in Afghanistan after 2001 
and the developments after the war against the Saddam regime was 
declared won by President Bush on 2 May 2003, a l l  have several 
fundamental features in common: 
8 Nils Marius Rekkedal, 'Fransk operationskonst [French Operational Art]' in Rekkedal and 
Zetterling, Grundbok i operationskonst, (Stockholm :  SNDC, 2004), pp. 210-278. 
9 Bowden, Black Hawk Down. 
10 As an illustration of the lack of interest in writing books on this subject, the USMC's manual 
from 1940, Small Arms War, is sti l l  seen as 'current' by many people and new editions are 
always being printed. 
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1 .  The lengthy operations we also see today reflect many of the 
'non-l inear' and 'unconventional' features that Trinquier also wrote 
about in  his time. 
2. Trinquier called the form of warfare he described 'modern warfare' 
to distinguish it from the traditional European form of warfare: 
war between sovereign states. What he wanted to emphasise 
was that the war was of a different nature to the form of warfare 
that had characterised 'the war to end all wars': the Second World 
War. 
3 .  Trinquier probably believed that modern war consisted of a battle 
between the forces that wanted to modernise the state and create 
a modern society and their opponents who wanted to prevent 
the new thinking that 'the modern forces'/the Western ideas 
represented being allowed to dominate the future.11 It was implied 
that those who took up this form of destructive insurgency were 
fundamentally against modernisation .  The counter-forces would 
either defend the traditional forces and values or were adherents 
of 'Communism', a modern form of 'reactionary rel igion' as he 
and many others who led counter-insurgency saw it. These 
organisations' methods of combat were based on guerri l la warfare 
and terrorism . 
French theorists such as Roger Trinquier and several of his 
contem pora ry French  m i l ita ry leaders we re confro nted by 
revolutionary warfare in Indochina during the lengthy war against 
the Vietminh .12 In 1951, the French had set up a special unit in 
Indoch ina ,  ca l l ed th e Groupementde de Commandos Mixtes 
Aeroportes (GCMA), an organisation that would try to fight the 
Vietminh's increasing control over the population in the rural areas. 
Everything was organised as a resistance movement against the 
Vietminh and they wanted to mobil ise different minorities, which 
would be set up as small self-defence areas and indirectly contribute 
to the Vietminh losing control of their own rear areas. The group 
was to infiltrate the local population, gather intel ligence and set up 
1 1  Trinquier, Modern Warfare, pp. 5-7. 
12 Rekkedal, 'Fransk operationskonst', pp. 245-266. See also Paul-Marie de la Goree, The 
French Army: A Military-Political History {New York: George Braziller, 1963), pp. 440-449. 
Goree characterised the war as follows: 'The Algerian War was to be the last, probably, and 
certainly the greatest and most dramatic of colonial wars' (p. 447). 
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smal l  guerri l la units. The GCMA quickly grew in size through the 
deliberate recruitment of minorities that were traditionally most 
sceptical of the Vietnamese, such as the T'ai and Meo tribes. In May 
1953, the then Major Trinquier took over ,as -GCMA-commander, a 
force that had grown to almost 20,000 men covering several thousand 
square kilometres by the spring of 1954. Few majors have commanded 
such an important force. He had already previously been a regional 
commander for assignments in  North Vietnam and had a good 
knowledge of guerril la and counter-guerri l la activities. On the basis 
of his own experiences he felt that a local maquis (resistance area) 
should consist of a maximum of 1,000 guerri l la soldiers supported 
by between 2,000 and 3,000 'support troops' from the actual tribes. 
Based on the experiences they had gathered, the Vietminh were not 
able to defeat a force l ike this without deploying an even bigger 
conventional force. As he saw it, the mission of a maquis was to : 
1 .  Prevent the local population col laborating with the Vietminh.  
2. Develop a n  atmosphere of permanent insecurity within the 
Vietminh's own area . 
3. Eventually invite the local population to become more and more 
active in operations di rected at the Vietminh's establ ished 
infrastructure and political structure within their own area . 13 
His own operations were obviously strongly influenced by the 
French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, or as it says in  an excel lent 
understatement in the book: 'The regrettable Dien Bien Phu incident 
( ... )'14 It was during his latter years in Indochina that Trinquier began 
his comprehensive study into what he later cal led 'modern warfare'. 
He was final ly promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in 1956 and later 
served under General Massu in the 10th Paratrooper Division in Algeria 
in 1957. By then, he already had several decades of service and 
what he experienced in Algeria, particularly the fighting against the 
insurgent movement FNL in the capital of Algiers in 1957-1958, was 
what inspired him to write about how insurgent movements could 
be dealt with.15 Clearly inspired by what these el ite forces believed 
13 Trinquier, Modem Warfare, pp. 107-111. 
14 Trinquier, (1964), ibid., p. 110. 
15 For a general historical presentation, see Alexander and Keiger (eds.), France and the 
Algerian War 1954-62; see particularly Alexander and Keiger, 'France and the Algerian War: 
Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy', pp. 1-34. 
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they had learned from the lost war in Indochina, there was one 
requirement that had to be satisfied if one were to have any hope of · 
winning : securing the support of the local population . One had to at 
least avoid the population turning against one if one was to achieve 
any mi l itary and pol itical success at a l l .  If one was to succeed, hard 
and systematic efforts were required . Counter-insurgency, if it is to 
lead to the desired pol itical goal, assumes that: 
Warfare is now a coherent system of measures - pol itical, 
economic, psychological, and mi l itary - which, col lectively, 
seek to throw down the establ ished authorities in a country 
and replace these with a new regime. In order to achieve this 
goal, the insurgent attempts to exploit the internal antagonism 
existing in the country attacked - ideological, social, religious, 
economic - i .e., all forms of conflict that may influence the 
population it is desired to control ( . . . ) 16 
Trinquier writes openly about the difficulties the French had using 
a traditional ly trained and equipped modern, armoured force that 
had been developed and tra ined to be able to combat a sim i larly 
equipped enemy. If such a force is deployed to take on a guerril la 
force 'it is reminiscent of the situation that arises if one lets a lorry 
driver try to run over a fly and who is constantly forced to try again'. 
In Indonesia, the French mi l itary leaders had 'tried to force the 
Vietminh into a decisive battle, the only form of battle the French 
mastered, in the hope that their material superiority would then give 
them a cheap victory'. 17 The only way possible to avoid th is form of 
mistake was, according to Trinquier, to combat the hosti le organisation 
that most insurgent groups develop in order to be able to chal lenge 
the status quo. 
( . . .  ) Victory wil l  only be able to be achieved through the 
complete destruction of (the secret) organisation (that wishes 
to dominate the population) .  This is the main concept that 
must guide us in our studies of modern warfare. 18 
16 Trinquier (1964), ibid. , p. 6. 17 Trinquier (1964), ibid. , p. 3.  
1 8  Ibid. , pp. 8-9. 
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It is never enough for patrols to walk (or drive) through cities if 
one is to be able to deal with and combat a n  urban i nsurgent 
movement that is being formed. If one is to succeed, one must gain 
access to good intelligence and be able to infiltrate the enemy's 
organisations by means of local agents. It is necessary to penetrate 
the enemy's secret organisations and cells. Equipped with the insight 
that this type of personal experience provides, the government forces 
can remove or weaken the insurgents' ability to frighten or persuade 
the people to join the insurgent forces or their political/religious 
organisations. It is assumed that the successful organisation of an 
insurgency will normally consist of the four following elements/ 
components: 
1. The establishment of so-cal led 'secret cells' that function as a 
hidden network. 
2. They carry out acts of terror to show the majority of people that 
they are not safe, i .e ., they wish to create a feeling of insecurity 
a mong the population and thereby show that the centra l 
authorities are not able to control developments. Only the 
insurgents can provide safety! 
3.  They implement a series of measures to gain the support (or at 
least the sympathy) of the majority of people. 
4. They implement the measures they see themselves being able 
to carry out with a view to undermining support for the new 
regime (as in Iraq today) in order to demonstrate that those 
governing are not in control of the situation . It is only if the 
insurgency is victorious that there can be peace in the area . 
Here, the claim can be made that, even if much of French thinking 
on insurgency may probably seem less than topical today, there is 
still something that could be learned from their extensive experiences 
from the co lon ia l  period, and  particularly from Algeria . The 
groundwork for military theory and associated operational patterns 
must, however, always be adapted to modern reality. The importance 
of the mass media in particular and the greatly changed pol itical 
situation in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War make it necessary 
to careful ly think through which of the French experiences could 
possibly sti l l  be relevant. 
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c. The need for alternative military thinking 
Historical ly, it has proved to be the case that, if a new regime is 
not able to identify and systematica l ly overcome the infrastructure 
that the insurgents have bui lt up, the new and, in itial ly, weak regime 
wi l l simply not be able to survive. In conventional warfare one cannot 
win the war by fighting individual soldiers and sma l l  units. The entire 
warfare has the aim of overcoming the enemy state's mil itary capacity 
and will to continue the war. Two terms that have become increasingly 
common are anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism respectively. The 
first term was used to describe the more passive or defensive 
measures the government forces implement and, at the same time, 
it is used for the measures that individuals and companies can 
implement to reduce their own vulnerability or to protect private 
property against devastation .  Counter-terrorism is a newer term that 
covers the more active, often offensive measures that a re 
implemented to prevent, deter and/or foi l  terrorism. 
Simi larly, in counter-insurgency with regard to the various forms 
of guerri l la warfare/low intensity warfare, one must attempt to 
overcome the insurgents' organisation as an entity and one cannot 
satisfy oneself with overcoming small armed groups or other peripheral 
elements if one is to have any hope of winning. Without those leading 
the mil itary and civi l ian efforts of states are being able to understand 
this important distinction, even a superpower can have problems 
defeating a wel l -organised insurgent movement. Taking out the 
leadership is more important in counter-insurgency than in ordinary 
warfare. T his is because: 
1. An insurgent movement wi l l , for security reasons, have as much 
information as possible stored central ly with its leadership. The 
troops wi l l  seldom be given access to imminent mi l itary plans 
and never access to the strategy for winning. 
2. An insurgent movement does not have the same abil ity to replace 
its leadership as regular forces (where you have a system of 
ranks, procedures for appointments, etc.). 
3. An insurgent leader needs to have special charisma and a cult of 
the individual is often bu i lt up around him . Without a leader, the 
actual organisation may collapse, as happened in Peru (PCP), 
Angola (UNITA) and Turkey (PKK). 
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In addition, the leadership of an insurgency rarely has any special 
physical protection. They often live in a base area or concealed among 
the population. If one has good intel l igence, there is a chance of 
taking out the persons in question . 
In .1991, the Israeli historian and mil itary theorist Martin van 
Creveld claimed in his book Transformation of War something similar 
to what Trinquier discussed in his day.19 Creveld asserted here that 
we would see a decline in traditional warfare between conventional 
state forces while warfare where guerril la forces, insurgents, terrorists 
and other forms of undermining states would dominate the picture. 
Today, this is a not uncommon point of view and many modern 
analysts do as Trinquier did : they real ise that, if one is to be able to 
deal with the actual problems in connection with warfare, one must 
be able to d istinguish, on the one hand, between traditional 
conventional warfare and what works in this respect and, on the 
other hand, the political methods and objectives, tactics, combat 
techniques and, not least, norms that apply within guerri l la and 
insurgent movements. In his time, Trinquier described developments 
as he saw them, after he had, by way of introduction, compared the 
relative resources between a state and an insurgent movement. He 
described the problem in this way: 
By studying this table (Note: on table - 'traditional army versus 
guerrilla band,' p. 62 in his book), we can see that the guerri l la's 
greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area 
(which he himself has chosen) and its potential, and the 
support given him by the inhabitants. 20 
If one is to be successful in turning an imminent defeat into a 
victory, those combating the insurgency must understand the 
following: 
We have already seen how indispensable the support of the 
population is to the guerri l la .  It is possible for him to exist 
only where the people give him their unqual ified support. He 
cannot live among a populace he has not previously organized 
19 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War. 
20 Trinquier, Modem Warfare, p. 62. 
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and subjected to h is wil l ,  because it is from it that he m ust 
d raw his sustenance and protection . ( . . . ) But th is total 
dependence upon terrain and population is also the guerri l la's 
weak point. 21 
This experience has been repeated later by very many authors 
who have studied guerril la wars. If a government is to be able to 
hope for lasting progress against a wel l-organised and led guerril la 
movement, it must work actively and systematica l ly the entire time 
to get the local population on its side, at the same time as maintaining 
the mi l itary, pol ice and administrative pressure on the guerri l la's 
mi l itary forces and pol itical cadres. In practice, th is is an extremely 
compl icated operation that wi l l  need to go on for many years in most 
cases. It wi l l  not be until the guerri l la movement real ises that it 
cannot win mi l itarily that a lasting political solution can be arrived at. 
An insurgent movement that wants to negotiate wi l l often increase 
its mi l itary activity before the negotiations. In so doing, they want to 
give the impression that they have increased in strength and are on 
the way to winning and to thereby ensure a better negotiating position, 
cf., the FMLN's 'final offensive' in 1989.22 'Poker tactics' l ike these a re 
not easy to see through if one does not have good intel l igence. 
Obviously, the government forces could do the same prior to the 
desired negotiations. 
Similarly, the ruling regime must be prepared to undertake the 
necessary social, economic and politica l reforms to get the population 
on its side. This is a lways a reason for this type of insurgency breaking 
out and, without being able to accommodate reasonable demands 
from the areas that have supported the insurgency; it wil l  probably 
continue (or break out again, even if one has achieved a temporary 
negotiated solution). 
As already previously demonstrated, it is a historical lesson written 
about counter-insurgency by several of the earl ier theorists that these 
efforts wi l l  not work if one is content with passive measures l ike 
patrols driving around in bui lt-up or rural areas. This type of activity 
21 Ibid. , pp. 62-64. 
22 Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 143. 
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is never sufficient to be able to monitor and eventual ly overcome a 
well-organised insurgent movement. As already previously indicated, 
it is necessary that the counter-insurgents try the entire time to seek 
to neutra l ise both the insurgents' open and secret organisations so 
that the insurgents wi l l  not succeed in forcing their wi l l  upon the 
local population .  The ru l ing regime must fight the insurgents' 
infrastructure if it is to survive. In other words, the insurgents must 
be fought with the means that are available. Seen in this l ight, this is 
a feature of guerri l la warfare that bears several similarities to how 
traditional warfare is fought. No effective warfare is primari ly based 
on "hunting" individuals or smal l  units. One assumes that it is the 
state's total resources and particularly its wi l l ingness to continue the 
war that is most centra l .  In 'the new wars' being fought it is probably 
vital to focus on the fact that one is attempting to overcome an 
organisation and not just be satisfied with combating the mi l itary 
power or other external symbols of power. Without being successful 
in combating the insurgency's central organisational ability/leadership, 
the insurgents will, even after having losses inflicted on them, always 
be able to reorganise and come back stronger. 
In the previously discussed book, Trinquier proposes three simple 
principles as to how one shou ld th ink with regard to political and 
mi l itary efforts: 
1 .  Make sure that a distinction is made between the guerri l la and 
the population that has in itially supported the insurgency.23 
2. Take (physical) control of the areas from which the guerri l la initially 
began the insurgency, make it a dangerous area for him to operate 
from and focus on turning the local population against the guerri l la 
movement. 
3. Maintain long- lasting and wel l-coordinated campaigns in as big 
an area as one is able to. T his wi l l  contribute to it becoming 
difficult for the guerri l la to regain control over important population 
centres that can provide real support for the guerri l la. 24 (It should 
be noted in this respect that this is, to an extent, in contrast to 
23 Probably he is thinking more about scaring the population from collaborating with the 
insurgents than what the British have called 'winning hearts and minds' campaigns. 
24Trinquier ( 1964), ibid, pp. 113-1 15. The problems dealt with in the above three points run 
through today's debate on control structures and the size of modern ground forces. If, for 
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the experiences the Americans had from their 'sweep' operations 
during the Vietnam War.) 
The three 'maxims' summarised here are obviously worded rather 
general ly. Those who hold the political and mil itary leadership in a 
given situation must themselves formulate the necessary concrete 
plans and procure the resources that the measures require. In reality, 
this is not an easy task, given the bureaucratic barriers that we have 
often seen when conventional forces attempt to organise and maintain 
over a long period of time these actual forms of pressure on an 
insurgent movement. 
d.  What is important for counter-insurgency operations? 
If one is to have any hope of being successful in implementing 
and carrying out operations based on the three recommended 
principles, one must also have developed a good intel ligence capacity. 
It is not enough to have access to satell ite pictures and technical 
intel l igence. There is, at least in the initial phase of a counter­
insurgency, a confrontation over who controls the population and 
has the initiative. 
If one is to have success, one must have both access to the 
thinking that prevails in the population and one must have a deep 
understanding of the cultural factors that have led to there being 
popu lar support for the insurgency. As a legacy of the Cold War, 
Western intel l igence has normal ly primari ly concentrated on the 
technica l gathering of information . There is rather l ittle capacity for 
good cultural and language ski l ls - the two most important factors if 
so-cal led 'human intel l igence' (HUMINT ) is to function as intended. 
Many of the sources that have written about American intel l igence 
problems during the continuation war in Iraq point precisely to how 
example, the Swedish or Norwegian Army is to participate in operations of this nature, it is 
necessary to look at the size of the ground forces that will be eventual ly required. Continuity 
of involvement particularly requires staying power and staying power obviously requires a 
certain quantity and this quantity necessitates sufficient units organised and trained for the 
purpose. A supply of modern materials and techniques is not enough to be able to keep th ings 
going for a long time, cf., the major American problems in Iraq today. It is the relatively 
modest numbers of forces given the size of a country and the size of the population that will 
govern how effectively the hostile Arab population can be controlled and which determines 
how large forces are required to control the population, more than material factors. 
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weak they are within HUMINT (see point The Im portance of 
Intel l igence).25 
As previously mentioned, it was also Trinquiers firm conviction 
that intel l igence was one of the most important factors if one was to 
succeed in  combating insurgents. Similar points of view have also 
been expressed by Sir Robert Thompson, Walter Laqueur, John S. 
Pustay and Douglas S. Blaufarb (see the bibliography).26 But Trinquier 
points out that a successful insurgent movement wi l l  require 'safe 
areas' that the guerril la can operate from and that there is a local 
situation where one can 'gather in' resources that one takes from 
the ru l i ng  reg i m e  a n d  the l oca l  popul ation .  As prev ious ly 
demonstrated, in modern times 'safe areas' is  perhaps a 'myth', unless 
the insurgents hav� a border with a kindly disposed state they can 
use. 
It is a lso critical that the insurgent movement becomes able to 
keep the initiative and makes sure it controls its own information/ 
propaganda so that it does have an adverse impact. Similarly, it will 
then be important for the ru l ing regime to be able to deny the 
insurgents 'free' access to the community's resources in the form of 
infrastructure, access to financial support and food items. It is also 
important to be able oneself to operate actively and wrench the 
initiative from the insurgents and their supporters and for one's own 
information and propaganda to be able to dea l with and dismiss the 
insurgents' corresponding psychological warfare and desire to discredit 
the ruling regime. 
If one is to be able to counter the insurgent's control over the 
population, those who are combating the insurgency must a lso 
25 One commentator who was clearly well informed was Matt Kelley. See, for example, his 
article 'U.S. Intelligence Effort Lacking in Specialists'. The San Diego Union-Tribune, 22 November 
2003, p. 1. (Please, otherwise refer to the published extract from the Congress hearings on 
the Iraq war that are on the Internet). 
26 Three 'standard works' on the war in Algeria are: Charles-Robert Ageron, Modem Algeria: A 
History from 1830 to Present(London : Hurst and Company, 1991); John Ruedy, Modem Algeria: 
The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992); 
Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, Revised edition (London: Penguin 
Books, 1987). For those wanting a more-detailed read of the warfare itself, see Alf Andrew 
Heggoy, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Algeria (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1972). An interesting work written by one of the central participants is: Andre Beaufre, 
La Guerre Revolutionnaire [Revolutionary War] ( Paris: Fayard, 1972) . 
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organise 'counter contra!'. In practice, it has proved to be necessary 
to construct a l ist of what is happening in the population from the 
bottom up, and this requires that a strategy has been developed for 
what one is about to do. As most areas in the introductory phase 
take place down at a tactical level, there must be a willingness to 
think differently to how one would in a traditional operational system. 
Probably the first step is creating a list of who lives in  an area and 
who is the natural leader. Perhaps the local police have such lists. 
Perhaps the admin istration has them. But in  many developing 
countries there is often minimal control of who lives there as the 
entire rural system is based on other criteria, e.g., belonging to a 
tribe or a clan .  
It is  clearly at  this lowest level that much can go wrong. If  one 
does not, as is necessary, take into account the local conditions, one 
will quickly fall out with the local leaders. Consequently, a l ist of the 
local hierarchies, including the religious and secular leadership, must 
be obtained. This is particu larly important if it is a traditional farming 
community one is operating within, but simi lar ( informal) hierarchies 
normal ly a lso exist in cities, particularly in the Third World. It is 
important to quickly get an overview of which local leaders are positive 
to the regime and play on this. Similarly, one must establish a system 
to be able to fol low what active enemies of the regime and/or guerri l la 
sympathisers are doing . In practice, this type of measure requires 
that one ma i nta i ns censuses and issues identity cards with 
photographs, at the same time as developing an intelligence system 
that can cover the entire country. This is where Mao Zedong's 
description of separating the 'fish from the water' appl ies, where the 
'fish' are the insurgents - the insurgents are then 'visible' and can be 
fought. 
One of the books that came out in the aftermath of the Vietnam 
War, written by one of the leading officers in the US Army, Lieutenant 
General John H. Hay, has the title Tactica l and Mi l itary Innovations. 
In the book, which was published in 1974, we see how short a distance 
the Americans had come in their insight into what revolutionary war/ 
counter-insurgency was, even if they then had, at least theoretica l ly, 
gained about 10  years of mi l itary experience of continual warfare in 
South Vietnam. The general also writes here about the importance 
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of technology and helicopters, etc., and claimed that ' the widespread 
use of helicopter (. . .) the most significant advance of the Vietnam 
war'. He also stated that: 'It is difficult to exaggerate the capabilities 
of the airmobile team in Vietnam; the team represented the most 
revolutionary change in warfare since the blitzkrieg'. 27 Since this 
opinion came from one of the highest-ranking generals and one of 
those who had been involved and led the Vietnam War, it provides us 
with cause for reflection. The opinion can be seen as an argument as 
to why, as late as in 1974, after about 20 years of more or less active 
participation in this form of warfare, the US Army had sti l l  not yet 
understood what the core of revolutionary warfare was. They probably 
did not real ise what Mao's form of 'Revolution in Mil itary Affairs' 
actual ly was : revolutionary warfare that assumed that it was oneself 
that was material ly the weaker party. In order to compensate for the 
logistical and technological shortcomings that they realised they had, 
they focused total ly on developing the political aspect of warfare. 
This new real ity was not yet understood within large sections of the 
US Army's officer corps and they were consequently not able to 
understand that, in this kind of war, it is not just first class materials 
and modified tactics that mean something. What is important is to 
ultimately win (or at least avoid losing) the war, not necessarily winning 
a l l  skirmishes and battles. The so-cal led body count is of no great 
importance if the population's sympathies l ie with the insurgents. 
If one were to summarise the long story that ended in defeat for 
South Vietnam in May 1975, ironica l ly as the result of a conventional 
mil itary invasion by North Vietnam, it would have to be that, despite 
an endless series of technological and organisational improvements 
and developments, they had had only one main solution to a l l  the 
problems they had encountered during the attempt to stop the 
Communist insurgency, namely, a massive use of firepower. And it 
was precisely firepower that General Wil l iam Westmoreland ( 19 14-
2005) had used as a reply, not a total rearrangement of the actual 
doctrine for counter-insurgency.28 What was lacking was the American 
27 John H. Hay, Jr., Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Material Innovations (Washington, D.C. : 
Department of the Army, 1974), p. 179. 
28If one reads the general's own memoirs, we see that he did not entirely understand, even in 
the aftermath, what he had been up against in the shape of the Communist war leaders in 
North Vietnam, see Wil l iam Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Da Capo Press, 
1989), p. 275, 280-283. 
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officer corps having an acceptable pol itico-mi l itary insight and 
experience, something that, despite everything, the higher British 
officers had demonstrated the benefit of, to a far greater extent, in 
connection with their many colonial wars in Asia and Africa during 
the same era. The importance of such an insight is, if possible, even 
more important today, particularly as a result of the new and clearly 
more offensive media coverage as a reality of the world today. 
The trick today is also to undertake the necessary political and 
mi l itary measures without this being seen as clearly offensive to the 
majority of people. It is definitely no easy task and can only be 
carried out if one has the necessary local knowledge and combines 
this with the selective use of mi l itary force. 
e. 'A mixture of the use of force and persuasion' 
If we are to try to summarise what normally characterises the 
various forms of insurgency, we see that there are two features that 
almost a lways recur:  
1 .  The insurgents wi l l  implement a series of measures aimed at 
those who l ive in the actual area, with a view to directly influencing 
the population's support for the insurgency. 
2. In addition, they will implement a series of measures against the 
enemy, i .e., against the ruling regime and the machinery of power 
the government represents. 
The two circumstances mentioned above wil l  always be connected 
and it is consequently often difficult to distinguish between them for 
those coming from outside. If the insurgent movement is to have 
any success, its methods must be adapted within both areas and it 
should be able to adapt its own methods in such a way that they fit 
in with local circumstances. What is most common is for insurgent 
movements to use a combination of pressure and persuasion aimed 
at the population, i .e., success wi l l  be a result of how they manage 
to achieve a successfu l mixture of the use of force and persuasion . 
Seen through the eyes of the insurgents, success wi l l  be dependent 
on them achieving the 'correct' mixture of viol ence, pol itical 
approaches, psychology and economic pressure - adapted to the 
situation and the strength of the central power. If the insurgents are 
to be successful in carrying out a coordinated programme l ike this, 
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the insurgents' leaders must succeed in developing an adapted 
organisation. This may take place by them taking control of an 
established party or largish organisation or, as is most common : they 
develop a new organisation . 
The UCK, which was extremely apolitical during the war in Kosovo 
in 1999, appointed a pol itical representative from within.  The so­
cal led LICK-Macedonia insurgents did the same three years later. In 
the case of ethnica l ly based insurgent movements l ike these, it is not 
strictly necessary to seek political al lies in this manner. This is because 
the insurgents wi l l  usual ly have support from their own ethnic group 
nevertheless. Those who are to participate in counter-insurgency 
should have realistic objectives from the very beginning . As previously 
indicated, there are many examples of less successful attempts that 
one could possibly study and try to learn something from . It is 
important that all key civi lian and mil itary leaders know someth ing 
about this form of warfare if they are to be able to prioritise properly. 
How should mi l itary organisations be designed in order to not only 
be able to meet the mi l itary objectives set but to also accommodate 
the overriding pol itical objectives? And, along the same l ines, are 
the political objectives that have been set sufficiently precise for the 
mi l itary and their political taskmasters to design a comprehensive 
mi litary, pol itica l,  economic and social approach to confl ict resolution 
in ongoing or future campaigns/operations? It is difficult to give an 
answer to the last question, but it is of vital importance for future 
war planning that one has an insight into the complexity of this and 
tries to see beyond the next battle. There are many historical examples 
of leaders who become involved in wars where they had no clear 
strategic goals and where they realised a bit into the war that they 
did not real ly know why they were taking part. The Johnson 
administration, which had begun the escalation of mi l itary support 
to South Vietnam from March 1965, can perhaps be accused of having 
' lost its direction' after the Communist Tet Offensive in the spring of 
1968 - and eventual ly became unable to find adequate policies and 
mil itary responses to the developments that the escalation of the 
war had led to. 
If a regime and its supporters are to be able to resist a wel l- led 
insurgency, they must eventual ly succeed in securing victory in the 
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battle for the support of the population.  Then the methods one uses 
must eventually be adapted to the real situation for these efforts to 
achieve the desired effect. There is hardly any perfect ' recipe' for 
organising and leading counter-insurgency and, h istorical ly, it has 
proved necessary to organise oneself in extremely different ways. 
This also depends on the local geography, demography and cl imate, 
what form of society is threatened and it is particularly important to 
what extent the insurgents actual ly receive support from the local 
population - if any at a l l .  
As previously indicated several times, both the government and 
insu rgents m ust be able to combine pol itica l ,  economic and 
psychological measures with directly influencing the population while, 
at the same time, carrying out armed attacks against the adversary 
if they are to have success. We also see that those who have personal 
experience of leading counter-insurgency, and who have later written 
about this, a l l  emphasise that several coordinated measures are 
required . Operations carried out by the state's security forces, 
including the mi l itary forces, are useful if they are carried out within 
the defensive concept that one assumes has been laid down in order 
to meet the new threat. If the importance of a hol istic view such as 
this is not understood, mi l itary efforts wil l  often contribute to 
consolidating negative developments. 
The actual civilian leaders, officers, soldiers and other state bodies 
and officials participating in connection with combating terrorism 
must have access to this type of knowledge and experience if they 
are to have success with regard to counter-insurgency. But if the 
ruling regime is not able to adjust its policies in order to meet the 
new chal lenges, the efforts of the existing security forces are hardly 
l ikely to be enough to turn these negative developments a round and 
the regime wi l l  fa l l  sooner or later. 
If the threatened regime cannot create a clear distinction between 
the terrorists/insurgents and the 'normal' civi l ian population that the 
insurgents use as a recruiting base, it wi l l  be difficult to achieve a 
lasting peace. Consequently, civi l ian efforts, including the political 
element, are at least as important as purely mil itary and police efforts 
when one is faced with a largish and eventual ly wel l-organised 
insurgency. 
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f. Military and civilian measures should work in the same 
direction 
The lessons from the ongoing war in Iraq wi l l  probably be 
important - both for potential insurgent movements and terrorist 
groups, but a lso for the Western countries and their a l l ies in exposed 
areas. It is a lso important that the modern, more successful, insurgent 
movements wi l l  probably now interpret the situation as it being 
possible to win, even over a strong adversary, if one is able to keep 
the war going for a long period of time. The most important thing, 
seen through the eyes of the insurgents, wi l l  be to split the Western 
and/or other major, mi l itarily strong actors so that they are unable to 
establ ish effective col laboration and participation in operations in a 
conflict area . 29 At the same time, they wi l l  probably a lways try to 
avoid a massive American presence, i .e., make things so expensive 
in terms of money and human l ife for the US that the Americans give 
up attempting to win the local confl icts that are of less strategic 
significance to them.  The ideal scenario m ight be to cause the 
American withdrawal from an area of confl ict (or a general withdrawal 
of Western forces) as we saw in Somal ia in 1993 . An insurgent 
movement may try to achieve this by, for instance, directing operations 
at 'soft targets', by influencing loca l support for 'the foreigners' and 
synchronising their activities, placing great emphasis on exploiting 
Western and regional pressure, i .e., by themselves making use of 
Info Ops (through the use of different types of media) .  The 'ru le of 
thumb' for propaganda today seems to be: to focus on attacks on 
civi l ians in the local press. In the external/international (for example, 
the American) press, it is the loss of their own soldiers that perhaps 
provides the greatest impact. 
As previously indicated, these new confl icts wil l  require extended 
cooperation between mi l itary and civi l ian authorities if one is to have 
any success against a competently led insurgent movement. In 
concrete terms, a form of ' integration' of Civil Military Operations 
29 This division is in many ways a reality in the Europe of today, something that insurgents, 
however, can only partly take credit for. As during, for instance, the Vietnam War and the 
Nicaragua conflict, these divisions often follow traditional party l ines. A change of government 
in Italy would probably also lead to this country leaving 'the coalition of the willing' as Spain 
and several other countries have also done. 
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(CMO) and 'pure' Civil Affairs (CA) is required, preferably so that 
they appear to be parallel activities but are nevertheless coordinated. 
In addition, there are obviously the purely mi l itary and pol ice 
stabi l isation and security tasks which also require that the national 
security forces can operate side by side with foreign troops who 
have been sent to a conflict area . 
There is much to suggest that psychological factors are a lways 
of major significance. When I have been involved in discussions about 
COIN with British officers, I have heard on several occasions that in 
Great Britain they bel ieve that it is their experience that the effect of 
ongoing mi l itary operations diminishes dramatical ly after about 100 
days. Al l the investments made during this relatively short period, 
e.g ., by means of CMO and CA, will have a substantia l  positive effect 
but, if these investments are made later, the effect wil l  diminish 
dramatical ly. If th is observation is correct, this can only be due to 
psychological factors. The general  expectation among the local 
population of an improvement in the situation as a result of the 
military intervention and clear mil itary resolution is initial ly a particular 
advantage for the victor. When the anticipated improvements do not 
material ise, attitudes change to disappointment and gradual ly also 
opposition and hostil ity towards the foreign forces from sections of 
the population . If those intervening do not 'strike the right cord' over 
the course of the first few weeks after launching a mil itary intervention 
in a restless area, the intervention force risks being itself seen as the 
problem. This is not exactly 'fair' but can nevertheless happen, and 
one should consequently plan for this possibil ity. If one is to become 
involved international ly, this is a danger that al l mi l itary and civi l ian 
planners should keep in mind.  
When participating in PSO and/or counter-insurgencies in the 
Third World in particular, in what is often an ad hoc coal ition, things 
can easily go wrong - and suddenly it is one's own forces that gets 
the blame for things going wrong. We have seen this happen in 
particu lar in connection with several UN- led operations that were 
based on rather unclear political mandates. From, at an early phase, 
being able to be seen as a l iberator, the intervention force may 
eventua l ly be regarded as the main problem - it is they who have 
become oppressors seen through the eyes of the insurgents. If this 
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is to be avoided, clear political mandates are necessary as wel l as 
access to knowledge about the area in question and the parties 
involved in the conflict and political support at home. A paral lel to 
developments in Iraq, where we have seen increasingly greater 
insurgent activity from the summer of 2002, is what one should 
always attempt to avoid. 
6. Summing up 
The continuing insurgency in Iraq underscores the capacity 
of the weak to impose considerable mi l itary and pol itical pain 
on the strong. Whether that pain will compel the United States 
to abandon its agenda in Iraq remains to be seen . What is 
not in dispute is that a l l  major fai led US uses of force since 
1945 - in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia -have been against 
material ly weaker enemies. In wars both hot and cold, the 
United States has fared consistently well against such powerful 
enemies as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet 
Union, but the record against lesser foes is decidedly mixed. 30 
As discussed earl ier in this book, the United States fought 'a kind 
of' counter-insurgency war in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. Andrew 
Mack wrote in  a sti l l  today interesting assessment publ ished a few 
months before the collapse in South Vietnam, that what made the 
great difference was the pol itical wi l l  to fight and prevai l  in war. 
Successfu l rebel l ions after the Second World War against European 
colonial powers as wel l as in Vietnam against the United States a l l  
had one thing in common: 'the materia lly weaker insurgent was more 
pol itica l ly determined to win because it had much more riding on the 
outcome of war than did the stronger external power, for whom the 
stakes were lower'. 3 1  Jeffrey Record writes: 
Superior strength of commitment thus compensates for 
mil itary inferiority. Because the outcome of the war can never 
be as important to the outside power as it is to those who 
have staked their very existence on victory, the weaker side 
fights harder, displaying a wi l l ingness to incur blood losses 
that wou ld be unacceptable to the stronger side. 32 
30 Jeffrey Record, "Why the Strong Lose", Parameter, Winter 2005-06, p. 16.  
31 Jeffrey Record, ibid. , p. 1 7. 
32 Record, ibid., p. 17. 
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There is no agreement in the long-lasting debate about the 
Vietnam War, and analysts like Summers, Blaufarb, Nagel, Thompson, 
Record et a l .  a l l  give different perspectives on the developments. 
But Record has argued that after Mao Zedong developed his theory 
and practice of irregular warfare known as 'protracted war' and 
'revolutionary war' in the 1930s, a theory which made it possible for 
the Communists to win, first, in China and later in Vietnam, the 
theory has inspired insurgents in many parts of the Third World. 
Probably, the American mil itary and political leaders never real ly 
understood the political nature of this warfare, nor the l imits this 
brought to its own conventional mi l itary power in the Vietnamese 
mil itary and political setting. The American forces were unable to 
corner and destroy an enemy with a superior will to win the war, and 
with a leadership that had no problem with taking great casualties.33 
The stronger side's vulnerability to defeat in protracted conflicts 
against irregu lar  foes is arguably heightened if it is a 
democracy. ( . . .  ) For democracies, the strategy of "barbarism" 
against the weaker side's non-combatant social and pol itical 
support base is neither moral ly acceptable nor, over time, 
political sustainable. Since 1945, wars against colonial or ex­
colonial peoples have become increasingly unacceptable to 
most democratic states' political and moral sensibi l ities. ( . . . ) 
Democracies fail in smal l  wars because, more specifically, they 
are unable to resolve three related dilemmas: "how to reconcile 
the humanitarian values of a portion of the educated class 
with the brutal requirements of counter-insurgency warfare 
. . .  how to find a domestical ly acceptable trade-off between 
brutal ity and sacrifice, (and) how to preserve support for the 
war without undermining the democratic order." 34 
Some of the critics of the American way of conducting the Vietnam 
War have taken issue with the Johnson administration's attempt at 
operating in a 'counter-insurgency mode' which they say almost 
33 Record, ibid. , p. 20. 
34 Record, ibid. , p. 21 (with reference to Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, and 
the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam ( New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 15 .  
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guaranteed defeat. However, there is a problem here, as Harry G .  
Summers has excel lently shown i n  the introduction to his book, On 
Strategy: 
'You know you never defeated us on the battlefield', said the 
American colonel (Colonel Harry G. Summers) . The North 
Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark (Colonel Tu, Chief, 
North Vietnamese (ORV) Delegation) a moment. 'That may 
be so', he replied, 'but it is also irrelevant'. 35 
Summers a lso argues that it was not until after the war had 
already been lost on the American home front that the US Armed 
Forces put counter-insurgency into a proper perspective, namely, 'as 
a valuable adjunct to our military operations against North Vietnam'. 36 
Some have argued that the difficulty thatthe US has with counter­
insurgency warfare is a result of especial ly the US Army and the US 
Air Force not wanting to transform themselves in a way that would 
prioritise counter- insurgency; instead, they prefer conventional 
warfare based on technology and firepower superiority. This is an 
important and realistic claim . Some critics also argue that Washington's 
problem with counter-insurgency warfare is a result of its unwil l ingness 
to be utterly ruthless. This is probably not a tenable explanation; 
neither Nazi Germany during the Second World War nor the Soviet 
Union could have been accused of 'insufficient ruth lessness'. However, 
for exam ple, the Yugoslav Partisan detachments wore down the 
German troops throughout their occupation, and the Afghan guerril las 
did the same to the Soviet Army in the 1980s. Counter-insurgency 
warfare is strategically and tactica lly difficult, and as Summers wrote : 
'tactical victory, strategic defeat' is always a possibil ity in war. 
The problem for a state and its pol itical regime or for an 
occupying force is that, unlike the insurgents who merely must not 
lose, the counter-insurgents must try to win. And because of 
asymmetric interests, time is probably never on the counter­
insurgents' side. 
35 'Conversations in Hanoi, 25'h April 1975', in H.  G. Summers, Jr., O n  Strategy, p. 1 and 6. 
36 Ibid., p. 156. 
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The American leaders fai led to understand the principles of 
political and mil itary asymmetry as an important part of revolutionary 
warfare - performed in 'North Vietnamese style'. Unless the United 
States won the war in a reasonable time period they risked problems: 
continuing to wage the war would have been political irrational. Time 
is normal ly on the side of guerri l las/insurgents if they have a 
sustainable force, and here North Vietnam functioned as 'the secure 
base' for a long war the Communist leadership in Hanoi intended to 
win.  
Lessons learned during a long war are applied most quickly at 
the tactical level . Squads, platoons and companies, which are most 
closely in contact with the insurgents and have the most immediate 
thing at stake - their l ives - tend to learn and adapt very quickly. One 
measure of good morale is the speed at which soldiers who are in 
contact with the enemy learn and change their behaviour, and another 
measure is the extent to which these changes are incorporated into 
new command flexibil ity, mi l itary concepts/doctrines. In addition, a 
measure of command effectiveness is the speed at which the 
operational and military strategic lessons are learned and implemented 
in the mi l itary organisation. 
Historical ly, it seems that normally it takes a longer time for 
generals/colonels to understand what is really going on inside an 
insurgency than it does for the junior ranks. Of course, there are 
exceptions, but this seems to be the most common development in 
a big bureaucratic organisation. And, natural ly, in the Western 
democratic structures, u ltimately it is the political leadership who 
decides on the next step during a war. Changes to the political- or 
mi l itary strategy wil l  take time, and a l l  changes entai l  a possible loss 
of political credibility for the ruling el ite. This was the development 
the American leadership had to deal with during the latter stages of 
the Vietnam War, and perhaps we today see a simi lar development 
three years into the war in Iraq? At any rate, some of the American 
political establishment and sections of the public have already lost 
al l  hope of winning the war, and are pressing for a military withdrawal .  
In the Iraq war in 2003, for instance, the Americans were 
surprised when their military worst-case scenario did not material ise: 
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the Iraqi Army did not attempt to make a stand in Baghdad, forcing 
the US military into urban (attritional) warfare. And the Iraqi insurgents 
must also have been pleasantly surprised by the length of time it 
took the Americans and their Iraqi a l l ies to real ise that they were 
now facing a flourishing insurgency/guerri l la war! The resulting 
slowness with which the US mil itary responded to the growing 
insurgency, made it much easier to organise and develop the often 
competing insurgency groups during 2003 and early 2004. 
On the other hand, the Americans were astonished by the tenacity 
of the insurgency, both the guerri l las' abil ity to sustain heavy casualties 
and their loose command structure which provided autonomy to smal l  
units, yet, at the same time, enabled the guerri l las to launch attacks 
at politically sensitive points. Moreover, the insurgents must have 
been taken aback by the rapid tactical learning curve displayed on 
the US side, resulting in their guerri lla operations incurring heavy 
losses of fighters, as wel l  as the political acumen that al lowed the 
Americans and others to contain most of the insurgency to the Sunni 
regions (which is sti l l  the situation in 2007, but the 'ethnic cleansing' 
and secretion ki l l ings of areas belonging to the other groups, which 
became a major problem in 2006 and early 2007, included of cause 
also jihadists, al-Qaeda and Shiite mi l itias and terror groups) . This 
should be a very important lesson from the war in Iraq until now -
but it also heralds a rea l new danger for the coming years when the 
American forces start to withdraw from the country: a ful l-blown civil 
war is l ikely (as commented on in earlier chapters) . 
In a political/strategic sense, the Iraqi insurgents probably have 
the simpler problems to deal with, as an insurgency has fewer options 
to choose from. However, a successful insurgency must be able to 
face and find solutions to upcoming chal lenges. Until now, the 
insurgents have been unable to build a strong 'united front' against 
the Americans and their supporters in Iraq. And without a strong 
leadership and a coherent pol itical platform, they can hardly win the 
war. But they can become the nucleus for a possible ful l-blown civil 
war if the new and untested Iraqi Armed Forces can not handle the 
developments. 
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1 .  At any rate, the fol lowing four points are very common in this 
kind of wars: The insurgents must be able to attack the target­
ri ch envi ron m e nt of admin istrative centres a n d  enemy 
deployments, i .e ., to execute unpredictable attacks, thereby 
increasing the losses sustained by �he Opponent. This creates a 
feeling of insecurity in the enemy camp, and indirectly it a lso wil l  
strike at  the enemy's morale. 
2. Maintain (good) relations with a host population that al lows 
regrouping, recruitment and re-supplying. While this population 
can be coerced, the primary problem is political, namely, the 
need to a lign the insurgency leadership with the interests of local 
leaders and other influential people. 
3. It is important to deny the enemy intelligence. This is done by 
using the genera l  population to 'camouflage' or conceal its 
operations. Thus, the enemy is forced to mount (traditional) 
mi l itary operations that simultaneously normal ly fail to destroy 
the i nsurgents, and a l so a l ienate the general popu lace. 
Alternatively, if the enemy refuses to attack the population, this 
must be used to improve the insurgents' security position .  
4. The guerri l las' purpose is to engender a sense of psychological 
helplessness in their conventionally trained and equipped enemy 
('the state forces'), with the goal of forcing the ruling pol itical 
el ite to abandon the fight, or at least to engage in negotiations 
favourable to the insurgents, as a means of self-defence for the 
regime. And, this is very important for the anti-guerri l la/COIN 
forces to understand: the guerrillas/insurgents do not need to 
win militarily. As mentioned earlier, the insurgents' goal may be 
modest: it wi l l  probably be good enough not to lose! 
The essence of so-cal led asymmetric warfare is not merely the 
different means used to fight the war, but the different interests in 
waging the war. In Vietnam, the fundamental difference between 
the two sides was this: the North Vietnamese had a transcendent 
interest in the outcome of the war, nothing mattered more for the 
Communist regime in Hanoi than winning. Whereas for the Americans, 
Vietnam was simply one interest among many and was not of 
overriding importance. Thus, the North Vietnamese could lose more 
forces, including sustaining heavy casualties, without losing their 
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psychological balance. The Americans, faced with much lower losses 
after the mil itarily successful Tet Offensive in 1968, felt a greater 
sense of helplessness and uncertainty, and sought to extricate 
themselves from a war that the North Vietnamese had neither an 
interest nor the means of exiting. 
Al l wars have ended either in the annihi lation of the enemy force 
or in  a negotiated settlement. The Second World War was a case of 
the former, but the outcomes of most other wars are negotiated. For 
the United States, Vietnam can be seen as a political and mi l itary 
defeat under cover of a political negotiation .  This is normally the 
case where insurgencies are waged : by the time the ruling regime 
and its conventional forces begin to negotiate, it is maybe too late. 
The ongoing war in Iraq has been slightly different. Here is an 
interesting point that needs to be made: other (strong) parties are 
present, who are capable and motivated. Some of these parties are 
other than the main adversaries today. I am, of course, talking about 
the Shi ite and Kurd factions in Iraq.  This suggests an eventual 
negotiated settlement - but nobody yet knows when . The key to 
successful negotiations is probably the threat of a major civil war 
and the potential that .the Shia, the main component of a home­
grown Iraqi force, eventual ly wi l l  crush the minority Sunnis. The 
very notion of this possibil ity has forced a number of Sunni leaders 
to cooperate with the efforts to quell the insurgency, and thus looking 
to secure their future in a post-occupation Iraq. 
The insurgency against the U .S.-led coalition and the new 
Iraqi government is centred in the Sunni-dominated parts of 
Iraq, primarily the four provinces that make up the "Sunni  
Tria ng le" and "Triang le of Death ." In these areas, the 
insurgency consists primarily of Iraqi nationalists from local 
Sun ni tribes and foreign jihadists led by Abu Musab al­
Zarqawi's network, al Qaeda in Iraq. Other Iraqi jihadist groups 
are active, notably Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah, which operates 
primarily in  Kurdish-dominated northern Iraq, but the jihadists 
under al-Zarqawi are responsible for the majority of suicide 
attacks. ( . . .  ) 
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Suicide attacks have declined in Iraq since December 2005. 
Compared with a year ago, when multiple, coordinated attacks 
occurred several times a week, the jihadist capabi lity appears 
greatly diminished. This could be the result of U .S. mi l itary 
pressure and a crackdown in Jordan following the Nov. 9 hotel 
bombings in Amman. The lack of support for the jihadists 
from the Sunni tribes, especial ly in Anbar province, however, 
probably is the most significant reason for the decl ine. 37 
But it is the volatil ity of relations between the ethnic and religious 
groups underlying the negotiations that can transform the outcome, 
in this case for the United States and its a l l ies, if the US is wi l l ing to 
stay put in Iraq for many more years. With the Bush administration 
in pol itical trouble, this is a difficult question to answer. 
Is it possible to learn from earlier COIN-campaigns? It seems 
harder to learn from the past than many maybe think, and counter­
insurgents 'a lways' repeat mistakes. The lessons of complexity, 
uncertainty, and risk assessment seem always very difficult to handle. 
It seems that the subject of counter-insurgency very often becomes 
problematic: planners often over-simplify the situation in the actual 
country, underestimate the risks involved, and exaggerate the level 
of control they can achieve over the course (and ultimate strategic 
outcome) of the war/conflict. They try to deny to themselves the 
complexity of this kind of war, and the fu l l  range of issues that must 
be dealt with politically and mil itarily. 
As for the lessons of the Iraqi insurgency to date, there is the 
need for objectivity in studying the actual problems in any country 
under threat from an active insurgency, and to accept the pol itical 
and military complexity of counter-insurgency. Denying the complexity 
of most counter-insurgency campaigns seems historical ly to have 
been very common. In doing so, many who writs about irregular 
warfare and insurgency, try to borrow ideas from past wars or historical 
examples, and they talk  about ' lessons', as if a few simple h istorical 
lessons from one conflict could be transferred easily to another. The 
end result is that, far too often, they end up 'rediscovering' the same 
3 7  'The Changing Shape of  the Insurgency in Iraq', quote froi;n Stratfor, Daily Terrorism Brief 
- Analysis Stratfor.com, March 10, 2006, 
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old failed slogans and oversimpl ifications and trot out al l  the same 
old case histories without real ly examining how valid they are today. 
For me, it is an interesting phenomenon that before 2001 I had no 
problem buying cheap second hand books on insurgency and counter­
insurgency written in the first 'counter-insurgency era' from 1960 to 
1975. After 9/11  the prices rocketed, and today 'classics' cost a lot of 
money. Some of them are now printed again l ike Ga lu la  and 
Thompson, because of the new interest in a 'lost art' - counter­
insurgency. 
There is probably a great deal to be learned from past wars if 
the lessons are careful ly chosen and adapted as potential insights 
into a new conflict rather than transferable paradigms. However, the 
Iraq War is not the Afghan War, much less the same as Mao Zedongs 
theory on revolutionary war, the Vietnam War, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, or Northern Ireland. There is probably l ittle to be gained 
from efforts to revive the same old tactical and technical solutions, 
without remembering past failures from the same conflicts! Words 
l ike 'oil spots', 'Special Forces', 'hearts and minds', 'protection walls 
and barriers� and 'sensor nets' are just a few examples of such efforts 
that now have been applied (uncritical ly) to the Iraq War. 
There is always a need for accurate mi litary planning and risk 
assessment in warfare, especially in counter-insurgency warfare. Much 
has been made in the internal American debate of the intel l igence 
fa i l u res i n  assess ing Iraq i  WMDs.  These fa i l u res pa le  into 
insignificance, however, in comparison with the fai lure of US policy 
and mil itary planners to accurately assess the overal l  situation in 
Iraq before engaging in war, and for misreading the risk of insurgency 
if the US did not carry out an effective mix of nation-building, good 
political handicraft, and the new catchword : 'stabil ity operations' 
(SASO) . This fai lure can hardly be made the responsibil ity of the 
American intelligence community. It was the responsibil ity of the US 
political and mi l itary leadership. Even the former 'Viceroy' in Iraq 
Paul Bremer seems now to have understood this : 
Pau l  Bremer, who led the US civil ian occupation authority in 
Iraq after the 2003 invasion, has admitted that the Americans 
'didn't really see' the threat coming from insurgents in the 
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country. He also criticised President George Bush and Defence 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, saying they had not listened to 
his concerns about the quality of Iraq's a rmy, and that 
ultimately the White House bore responsibility for decisions 
that had led to the current violence. ( . . . . ) 
In the TV interview Bremer admits the insurgency was a 
surprise. 'We really didn't see the insurgency coming,' he said, 
adding that he was worried about US plans, formulated in 
2004, to begin reducing their troop numbers in favour of 
relying on Iraqis. He said he raised concerns with Bush and 
Rumsfeld, but they were ignored. 'There was a tendency by 
the Pentagon to exaggerate the capability of the Iraqi forces,' 
he said . 
Bremer's critics say that he is trying to shift the blame away 
from himself for the violence in Iraq. Many experts have 
attacked his decision to disband the Iraqi army just after the 
invasion was complete as one of the main factors behind the 
insurgency. However, Bremer said the ultimate responsibility 
for the situation in Iraq lay at the door of the White House.  'I 
believe I did everything I could do . . . .  The President, in  the 
end, is responsible for making decisions,' he said. 38 
The military leaders and their planning staffs had the responsibility 
of bringing together policymakers, military planners, i ntelligence 
experts, and area experts to provide as accurate a picture of Iraq 
and the consequences of an invasion as possible. The planners may 
be accused of failing to exercise that responsibility. The US leading 
policymakers chose to act on a limited and h ighly ideological view of 
Iraq, as they planned for one extremely optimistic defin ition of 
success, but not for risk or failure. There was no real planning for so­
called 'stability operations' after the Saddam regime was militarily 
defeated. Key policymakers did not want to engage in nation-building 
and chose to believe that removing Saddam Hussein from power 
would leave the Iraqi Government functioning and intact. Plans were 
31 Paul Harris, 'US "missed signs of rebellion"', The Observer, 8 January 2006. 
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made on the basis that significant elements of the Iraqi armed forces 
would defect to the Coalition, remain passive, or put up  only token 
resistance. No real effort was made to ensure continuity of Iraqi 
governm ent or stabi l ity and security in Iraq's major cities and 
throughout the countryside. A wel l-known history of decades of 
serious sectarian and ethnic tension in Iraq was downplayed or 
ignored. 
Earlier actions by Saddam Hussein's regime that had crippled 
Iraq's economic development since the early years of the Iran-Iraq 
War in the 1980s were ignored . Iraq was probably assumed to sti l l  
be an oil-rich country whose economy could quickly recover if  the oil 
fields were not burned, and would easily transform itself into a modern 
capitalist structure in the process. The US's most senior mi l itary 
commanders com pounded these problems by planning for the 
conventional defeat of the enemy and an early exit from Iraq by 
making a deliberate effort to avoid the so-called 'Phase IV' and SASO­
operations. The fact that they did so to minimize the strain on the 
American force posture, and the 'waste' of US troops on ' low priority' 
missions, probably played an important role in creating the conditions 
under which the Iraqi insurgency groups could develop and flourish . 
Intelligence analysis is never anything like 'prophecy'. The civil ian 
and mil itary area experts and the intell igence community may not 
have predicted the exact nature of the insurgency that fol lowed. 
They did, however, provide ample warning that there was a risk that 
Iraqi exiles were often fail ing to provide a balanced or accurate picture 
of the situation in Iraq, and that so-cal led 'nation-building' would be 
both necessary and extremely difficult. The nation's top policymakers 
chose to both ignore and discourage such warnings as 'negative' and 
'exaggerated', and to plan for a 'quick mil itary success'. They did so 
after having seen both the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s 
and the sectarian and ethnic problems of Afghanistan after the 
invasion in 2001 .  The following points are some of the most important 
ones: 
1 .  The mi litary situation did not improve until more than a 
year after the fal l  of Saddam's regime, and at least six 
months after it became apparent for everyone who wanted 
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ultimately bui ld environments of fear and confusion on the 
insurgent side. Tactics of destroying non-military infrastructure 
and blockading civi lian suppl ies have h istorically been used to 
weaken the morale of civi lians and, when applicable, also the 
soldiers in the field belonging to the insurgency forces, through 
concern for their fami l ies. 
3 .  Any modern COIN doctrine, which ideal ly combines the political 
and mi l itary effort, is intended to guide, and thus to help view 
the overall government campaign and the military element of it 
through the prism of the core functions: 'find, fix, and strike'. 
The role of various agencies and the part they are to play should 
be clearly expressed in the overal l  campaign general's concept of 
operations (CONOPS). 
4. The intelligence services, elements of the Armed forces (including 
covert, overt, and clandestine), and other government agencies 
are used to 'find' the insurgent by gathering a l l  ava i lable 
information on the political and mil itary elements of the insurgent 
organisation .  
5.  The mi l itary services, the pol ice, and the major departments of 
government, combined with diplomatic efforts and an active 
'hearts and m inds' campaign ( including P I N FO), 'fix' the 
insurgent. 44 Local ly raised/recruited forces can a lso help to 'fix' 
and have been employed to good effect in numerous earl ier 
counter-insurgency campaigns. 
6. Uniformed mil itary and police units, Special Forces, psychological 
operations (PSYOPS), and not least the legal system, should 
spearhead the government's campaign to 'strike' at the insurgency. 
The campaign should a lso be reinforced through socio-economic 
activities/reforms such as reorganising local/regional government, 
creating new jobs, and improving local socia l/medical  services, 
etc. 
There is a clear relationship between force applied in conventional 
war and force applied during a counter-insurgency campaign. Modem 
... The NATO Glossary defines P INFO as 'Information which is released or published for the 
primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and 
support'. 
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mil itary doctrines based on so-cal led 'manoeuvre warfare theory' 
can be applied to both types of warfare, but with some modifications. 
In both situations force has to be applied selectively and in a controlled 
and measured fashion . Physical destruction is a means and not an 
end in a counter-insurgency campaign . The COIN doctrine should 
seek to help create the conditions for political success with less force, 
more quickly, and with reduced costs. The manoeuvre warfare/ 
approach theory shares a common ancestry with some of the most 
successful insurgent strategies. The mi litary planner who is ful ly 
acquainted with this theory and doctrine is more l ikely to cope with 
the real and inherent complexities of a counter-insurgency campaign 
than those who remain unaware of the doctrine/theory. The following 
short description maybe an i l lustration of the development over time 
in one ongoing insurgency; Iraq: 
The latest suicide attack comes as Iraq's Sunnis are turning 
on their former jihadist al l ies. Since October 2005, fighting 
between Sunni insurgents and foreign mil itants has been 
reported several times in Anbar province, particularly in Al 
Qaim on the Syrian border - one of the main entry points for 
jihadists. In Ar Ramadi, which has been a hotbed of the 
insurgency, local tribal leaders recently said they soon would 
clear the city of foreign fighters. This cessation of support 
would account for the decline in suicide bombings; without 
help from local Sunni tribes, the jihadists would find it difficult 
to plan attacks and get to their targets inside Iraq.  ( . . .  ) 
Since spring 2005, the U .S. mi l itary, often in conjunction with 
Iraqi forces, has conducted a series of offensive operations 
along the Euphrates River in Anbar province intended to shut 
down the rat line. The operations, however, would stem the 
flow of foreign fighters only as long as they lasted. Beginning 
in the summer, then, the U.S. military increased the frequency 
of the offensives in an effort to keep near-constant pressure 
on the jihadists and their Sunni al l ies in the months leading 
up to the Dec. 15 elections. Although the increased operational 
tempo taxed U .S. forces in the area, it wore on the insurgents 
as wel l .  The crackdown on jihadists in Jordan fol lowing the 
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Nov. 9 (05) suicide bombings - carried out by members of 
a l-Zarqawi's network - also could be complicating al-Zarqawi's 
efforts to shore up his ranks. With the Jordanian General 
Intel l igence Directorate clamping down on traffic in and out 
of Iraq, that alternative route through Anbar province would 
now be compromised . Although fighting in Iraq has claimed 
hundreds of l ives since the Feb. 22 bombing of the Shiite 
Golden Mosque in As Samarra and attacks against coalition 
and Iraqi security forces continue, the shape of the insurgency 
could be changing. Should subsequent political and mi l itary 
developments lead the Sunnis to bel ieve they have more to 
gain by unleashing the jihadists again, however, suicide attacks 
could increase.45 
But within the appl ication of any mil itary doctrine, it is vital for a 
commander to know what law applies in a given set of circumstances, 
and what it is that triggers any changes in the law to be applied. The 
answer to this type of question relates directly to the sort of so­
cal led rules of engagement ( RoE) that would be issued by a 
government and/or commander in the field . 
In many countries government ministers provide political direction 
and guidance to commanders by means of RoE that govern the 
application of force. It fol lows that such rules that are approved by 
ministers may only be changed by ministerial authority. Com manders 
will in tum wish to issue RoE to their subordinate commanders. These 
RoE will be devised within the discretion a llowed by the rules approved 
by ministers.46 
In discussing so-cal led 'success criteria', counter-insurgents need 
success as early as possible to demonstrate the will, the means, and 
the abil ity to defeat the insurgency. According to many of the 'classical' 
studies of earlier insurgencies, counter-insurgents normal ly avoid 
•s 'The Changing Shape of the Insurgency in Iraq', Stratfor; Daily Terrorism Brief- 10 March, 
2006, analysis@stratfor.com. 
46 RoE define the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to 
ensure that such application of force is carefully controlled. RoE are not intended to be used 
to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instructions. In passing orders to 
subordinates a commander at any level must always act within the RoE received but is not 
bound to use the full extent of the permission granted. 
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negotiations until they are in  a position of strength . Potentia l  
supporters wil l  flock to the insurgents' side out of fear of retaliation 
if the movement considers them disloyal .  The relationship between 
insurgents and the general population is a lways complex. Mao Zedong 
in h is time claimed that guerri l las move among the people as 'fish 
move through · water'. But he a lso warned that 'a revolution is not a 
dinner party� and many insurgents, including the National Liberation 
Front in South Vietnam, effectively used terror - often selectively 
applied - against civi l ians to force segments of the population into at 
least passive support.47 
The vast majority of armed conflict today occurs inside states 
rather than between them. 'For many countries in the world simmering 
internal war is a permanent condition'.48 Martin van Creveld predicts 
that '[a]s war between states exits through one side of history's 
revolving door, low-intensity conflicts among different organizations 
wil l  enter through the other'.49 
In this new climate of 'dirty' and difficult wars, in which political 
and mil itary tasks intertwine and the objective is more often 'nation­
building' than the destruction of an enemy army, the abil ity to learn 
quickly during operations, to create an organisational consensus on 
new ways of waging war (or of waging peace), and then to implement 
those changes may be of more importance for modern mi l itary 
institutions than ever before. It then requires mil itary institutions to 
accept as an integral part of their (organisational) cu lture the need 
to function in this new conflict environment at a l l  times as 'learning 
institutions'. 
As mentioned earlier, there are different 'schools of thought', but 
almost every leading work on counter-insurgency imparts the message 
that counter-insurgency is one of the hardest types of warfare to 
wage. The more we study the subject, the better we wi l l  understand 
the historica l chal lenge presented by insurgency. Jul ius Caesar 
47 His maybe best known and most studied book is: Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare 
(Norwalk, Con. :  The Easton Press, Collector's Edition, 1996. Original written in 1937.), see 
'What is Guerrilla Warfare', pp. 69-76. 
48 Metz, 'Insurgency after the Cold War', p. 63. 
49 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 224.Trisakri. 
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complained that his legions had trouble subduing the roving Britons 
because his men 'were little suited to this kind of enemy'. In the 
early 1800s, Carl von Clausewitz wrote of 'people's wars' in which 
'the element of resistance wi l l  exist everywhere and nowhere'. 
T. E .  Lawrence, the British officer who, during World War I, led 
Arab fighters against the Turkish rulers in the Middle East, described 
the campaign in h is 'classic' counter-insurgency book, Seven Pillars 
of Wisdom. Lawrence's is one of the relatively few books in the COIN 
l iterature written from the point of view of the insurgent. From his 
experience of inciting the Arab revolt against the Turks, he concluded 
that insurgents needed only 2 per cent active support from the 
population, and 98 per cent passive support. (Another important 
book is Mao Zedong's book On Guerrilla Warfare.) In a near­
hal lucinatory state, suffering from dysentery and lying in a tent, 
Lawrence real ised the key to defeating the Turkish Army: 'Armies 
were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems 
to the head', he wrote. Lawrence's guerrillas, by contrast, 'might be 
a vapour'. For the Turks, he concluded, 'war upon rebellion was messy 
and slow, l ike eating soup with a knife'. 
Because of this, it is important for the government under threat 
to use a combination of tools :  mi l itary forces, police, economic 
incentives, political reforms, diplomatic measures, i .e ., every tool a 
government under threat can bring into play. It is this combination 
of different but coordinated politica l/mil itary actions that hastens a 
permanent settlement in counter-insurgency. 
One reflection here on this d ifficult subject is th is :  the 
underestimation of the complexity involved in the planning process 
for an upcoming war is nothing new in mi l itary history. The German 
philosopher on war Carl von Clausewitz cal led this 'friction', and there 
is l ittle to suggest that military forces wi l l  ever be able to avoid these 
problems. Modern technology may be of some help here, but it is 
human decisions that are critical in war - especia l ly if it is a guerri l la 
war. 
I also can see the need for a more systematic mil itary debate with 
regard to studies/research concerning how military operations should 
be designed. It is not enough to be able to accommodate/satisfy 
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more short-term mi l itary objectives. The real problem, as I see it, is 
the difficulty a l l  nations have with predicting the consequences of 
their political and mi l itary ambitions. This always must include the 
objective of trying to win the peace. I realise that such thinking 
would perhaps have political consequences; and hopefu l ly, a real istic 
and objective planning is completed before taking decisions to become 
involved in future wars in the Third World or other mi l itary confl icts/ 
insurgencies. 
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Ringkasan Artikel : 
Pada tu l isan ini, dikemukakan contoh-contoh dan penjelasan 
s i ngkat mengena i  kontra - i nsu rjens i  ya n g  d i l a ku ka n  u ntu k 
mengendalikan pemberontakan, misalnya dalam sengketa bersenjata 
di Irlandia Utara, di Vietnam dan di Irak. Dalam hal in i ,  bukan 
teknologi baru yang menentukan hal tersebut, tetapi kemampuan 
untuk merumuskan sasaran dan menindaklanjutinya dengan suatu 
tindakan dalam jangka waktu tertentu yang akan menentukan berhasil 
tidaknya suatu kontra-insurjensi. 
Sejarah membuktikan bahwa ketidakmampuan untuk mengenali 
dan  m eng identifi kas ika n i n frastru ktu r  ya ng d i ba n g u n  o leh  
pemberontak akan  menyebabkan lemahnya suatu pemerintahan, 
karena pada umumnya suatu pemberontakan dilakukan dalam tingkat 
intensitas yang rendah dan dalam jangka waktu yang lama . Oleh 
karena itu pada prinsipnya, pemerintah harus dapat membedakan 
antara kelompok geri lya dengan penduduk yang pada awalnya 
mendukung pemberontakan tersebut, dan kemudian mengambi l  
kendal i  seh ingga di wilayah tersebut penduduknya menjadi tidak 
percaya dan berbal ik melawan pemberontak, serta tetap melakukan 
kampanye untuk tetap memegang kendali di wilayah itu seh ingga 
pemberontak tidak lagi mendapatkan dukungan dari penduduk 
setempat. 
Dalam mencapai hal tersebut harus dikembangkan kemampuan 
intelijen yang bagus. Hal ini bukan hanya berarti terdapat kemampuan 
untuk mengumpulkan informasi-informasi teknis saja, akan tetapi 
yang lebih penting adalah dapat menguasai bahasa dan budaya 
setempat. Pimpinan politik dan mil iter akan memerlukan suatu tempat 
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yang aman untuk mengumpulkan  informasi mengenai gerakan 
pemberontakan, seperti h ierarki dan kondisi loka l ,  termasuk 
kepemimpinan sekuler dan agama, serta menciptakan sistem yang 
dapat memanta u apa yang d i lakukan oleh pemberonta k  dan 
simpatisannya dari kalangan penduduk sipil . Hal ini merupakan aplikasi 
dari penjelasan Mao Zedong mengenai 'pemisahan ikan dari air'. 
Perlu dipahami bahwa ciri khas gerakan pemberontakan pada 
umumnya adalah adanya rangkaian tindakan untuk mempengaruhi 
secara langsung dukungan penduduk terhadap pemberontak serta 
rangkaian tindakan untuk melawan rejim yang berkuasa serta 
kekuatan pemerintah di mana ke dua ciri ini sela lu berhubungan 
satu sama lain, sehingga mereka biasanya akan menggabungkan 
kekerasan dengan pendekatan politik, psikologi dan tekanan ekonomi 
yang besar, bahkan dengan merebut kendali suatu partai besar atau 
dengan menciptakan organisasi baru. Berkenaan dengan hal tersebut 
maka pemerintah harus dapat membedakan pemberontak dengan 
penduduk sipil biasa yang mana biasanya direkrut oleh pemberontak. 
Esensi dalam peperangan yang bersifat asimetris adalah tidak 
hanya perbedaan alat yang digunakan untuk bertempur tetapi juga 
perbedaan kepentingan da lam peperangan itu sendiri . Dalam 
peperangan seperti itu, misalnya di Irak, pemberontak umumnya 
mampu untuk melakukan serangan pada pusat pemerintahan dengan 
melakukan serangan dadakan, menciptakan suasana tidak aman 
dalam basis-basis m usuh, melakukan pengelompokan, perekrutan 
dan pemenuhan logistik kembali .  Demikian pula menghalangi intelijen 
p i h a k  l awa n d e n g a n  cara mengg u n a ka n  p e n d u d u k  u ntuk 
mengkamuflasekan operasinya untuk meningkatkan keamanan 
mereka, dan menimbulkan kondisi psikologis yang tidak berdaya dari 
lawannya . 
Berkenaan dengan itu, maka tindakan yang sela lu diperlukan 
adalah perencanaan militer yang akurat serta prediksi mengenai risiko 
yang akan  terjadi dalam peperangan, khususnya dalam peperangan 
kontra-insurjensi. Pemimpin militer dan staf mereka harus mempunyai 
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tanggung jawab dalam mengumpulkan para pembuat kebijakan, 
perencana mi l iter, ah l i  intelijen dan ahli wilayah untuk memberikan 
gambaran yang akurat dalam gerakan kontra-insurjensi. Demikian 
pula, mereka harus dapat membuat rencana untuk dapat melakukan 
operasi stabi l itas, anal isis intelijen guna memprediksi tanda-tanda 
akan datangnya suatu pemberontakan, harus mampu mel ihat 
karakteristik bangsa dan wilayah di mana kontra-insurjensi mungkin 
atau dapat eksis, serta membuat rencana yang real istis yang 
mempertimbangkan risiko kegagalan dan kesuksesan.  
Kontra-insurjensi biasanya terdiri dari dua kategori utama, yaitu 
perang non-konvensional dan tindakan langsung. Perang konvensional 
m em i l i ki p r i n s i p ' baga imana  memena n g ka n  perang  ta n pa 
menembakkan satu peluru', sedangkan tindakan langsung lebih 
mengarah kepada operasi mil iter secara tradisional, yaitu penggunaan 
serangan jangka pendek pada saat pasukan khusus akan merebut, 
menangkap, memperoleh kembali atau menghancurkan senjata 
musuh dan i nformasi mereka . Perang konvensional bertujuan 
mengurangi standar kehidupan dan kebebasan dan kesulitan ekonomi, 
seh i ngga lawan tidak m a m pu menahan _serangan ,  seh ingga 
menciptakan ketakutan dan keputusasaan yang akhirnya menurunkan 
mora l .  
Da l a m  kedua jen is  peperangan tersebut, pasukan harus 
digunakan secara selektif, terkendal i  dan terukur. Kehancuran fisik 
sangat menentukan, akan tetapi bukan berarti berakhirnya suatu 
kampanye kontra-insurjensi. Dalam penerapan doktrin apapun, hal 
yang sangat penting bagi komandan adalah mengetahui hukum yang 
berlaku dalam suatu keadaan tertentu, dan apa yang memicu adanya 
perubahan dalam hukum yang akan diberlakukan, yang terdapat di 
dalam Aturan Pel ibatan yang dikeluarkan oleh suatu pemerintahan 
dan atau komandan di lapangan.  
Kebanyakan konflik bersenjata yang terjadi saat in i  adalah konflik 
yang terjadi di dalam suatu negara, sehingga tugas pimpinan politik 
dan  m i l iter b iasa nya leb ih  ditujukan kepada pem bangunan  
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kebangsaan daripada sekedar menghancurkan lawan, sehingga 
mereka harus memil iki kemampuan untuk belajar cepat selama 
operasi untuk menciptakan kesepakatan .  Hampir setiap upaya besar 
untuk mengatasi kontra-insurjensi memberikan gambaran  bahwa 
kontra-insurjensi adalah suatu jenis peperangan yang sul it. Semakin 
banyak d ipelajari ,  maka semakin baik  pemahaman kita aka n  
tantangan  sejara h  pemberontakan .  Karena itu, penti ng bagi 
pemerintah yang sedang berada dalam ancaman untuk menggunakan 
suatu kom binasi dari pasukan mi l iter, pol isi, insentif ekonomi, 
reformasi politik, upaya diplomatik, yang semuanya terkoordinasi 
dengan tindakan politik/mil iter yang akan mempercepat penyelesaian 
permanen dalam kontra-insurjensi. 
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